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PART I 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
I. Insurance Redlining 
1 
The literature on insurance practices as they relate to 
prices and neighborhoods follows two general tracks. First, 
voluminous information exists on the process of rate structuring 
and risk underwriting. Insurance companies ·need to aggregate 
loss information in order to determine their risk. The distinc-
tion between "fair" and "unfair" insurance practices to a large 
extent deals with whether or not prices are based on objective 
data. One definition states: "Unfair price discrimination 
exists where there are price differences which do not relate to 
cost or cost differences which are not reflected in price 
differences." 1 The second accumulation of literature deals with 
efforts to determine whether or not some risk factors are subjec-
tive and whether certain areas are perceived to be inherently of 
greater risk than data support. The second type of literature is 
of interest in this review. 
Background 
The role of casualty insurance within the personal property 
system has become interwoven with finance and investment 
security. Lending institutions usually require that property on 
which they are lending be insured. 2 One of the fundamental 
issues revolves around differing views as to whether insurance 
companies should be allowed to base decisions solely on the basis 
of profit or whether they should be called upon to serve some 
----------------------------------------------
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public interest--e.g., providing insurance as part of revitaliza-
tion efforts. The dynamics of this conflict have led to govern-
ment intervention in regulating insurance companies. As far back 
as 1914' the United States Supreme Court ruled in the 
German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Kansas that because insurance 
companies served as depositories of large sums of money and pro-
vided a vehicle for spreading risk on much of the nation's wealth 
that public control was required.3 
After the riots in the 1960's, public activist groups 
became more involved in scrutinizing insurance company practices 
in inner city neighborhoods. One of the concerns of these groups 
was that without access to reasonable insurance coverage at a 
reasonable rate, they would be unable to secure the amount of 
reinvestment capital necessary to revitalize older areas. The 
importance of insurance availability was emphasized in a 1968 
report by the President's National Advisory Panel on Insurance in 
Riot Affected Areas. 
Insurance is essential to revitalize cities. It is the 
cornerstone of credit. \-Ji thout insurance, bank and other 
financial institutions will not--and cannot--make loans. New 
housing cannot be constructed and existing housing cannot be 
repaired. New business cannot expand or even survive. 
Without insurance, buildings are allowed to deteriorate; 
services and jobs diminish. Efforts to rebuild the nation's 
cities cannot move forward. 4 Communities without insurance are communities without hope. 
As neighborhood organizations began to focus on the needs 
of various parts of the community, they became concerned about 
two primary factors. First, are the rates structured in as 
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objective a manner as purported? Second, do all areas of a 
community have equal access to insurance? 
Although the data used in rate structuring by the Insurance 
Services Offices (ISO) are extensive and accurate, critics have 
suggested that use of premium generated revenue as income is 
inadequate. Perhaps, the argument goes, some income genera ted 
from other investments should also be included and that would 
lower rates--assuming the other investment showed a profit. 5 
Another of the concerns expressed about rate structuring revolves 
around decisions that are made when interpreting the data. One 
author notes: 
Despite elaborate and complex computerized data-gathering 
systems, the fire insurance rate-making procedure appears 
strikingly arbitrary. In addition, it is not based on modern 
probability models of the causes or corre·lates of fire loss 
experience •.. 
Though the precise result of this arbitrariness is dif-
ficult to measure, it may neglect or at least diminish the 
usefulness of painstaking and expensive data-gathering and 
processing. While a great deal of obj ec ti ve analysis is 
carefully set forth, ultimate reliance in ra);e-making appears 
to be placed upon highly subjective factors. 0 
Implicit in this is the notion that values go into 
interpreting the data and that those values reflect bias. 
As investigations of the availability of insurance became a 
concern and the focus of more and more studies, lists of prac-
tices emerge that became construed as redlining. One such list 
provides the following methods of redlining: 
1. Placing agents selectively in order to reduce the 
opportunity to secure business in certain areas; 
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2. Terminating "unprofitable'' agents and nonrenewing 
terminated agents' books of business; 
3. Requiring insurance to replacement cost value and 
refusing to insure dwellings with a substantial disparity 
between replacement cost and market value (if such property 
were insured it would create what is referred to as a "moral 
hazard" since the insured would presumably have an incentive 
to burn his or her own house down or commit "arson for 
profit"); 
4. Refusing, limiting, or varying insurance availability 
solely because of age of structure; 
5. Refusing, limiting, or varying insurance availability 
due to subjective evaluations by agents or by inspectors that 
certain areas are "deteriorating" or "changing"; 
6. Refusing, limiting, or varying insurance availability 
due to subjective perceptions of "adverse factors" such as 
the race or sex of an applicant or the racial composition of 
the geographic area in which the risk is located; 
7. Requiring inspections in certain locations within a 
state but not within other locations; 
8. Applying territorial classifications 
locations of a state but not in others; 
in certain 
9. Pricing insurance at such high levels that for all 
practical purposes it is unavailable; 
10. Informally instructing or formally requiring agents to 
avoid certain areas; 
11. Varying underwriting practices solely by ZIP code; 
12. Refusing to accept an 
previously rejected by another 
was previously insured fnder 
Requirements (FAIR) plan. 
Changing Roles 
application because it was 
company or because the risk 
a Fair Access to Insurance 
Inner-city riots of the 1960's brought about fundamental 
change. For one thing, insurance companies became more concerned 
about their exposure in inner-city areas. Furthermore, the 
federal government became concerned about the lack of insurance 
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opportunities in inner-city areas. Both the 1968 and ·197& 
Presidential Advisory Boards on Insurance found that lack of 
insurance availability and urban decline seemed to co-exist. 8 
Noting that insurance companies also need to make a profit 
and provide security for their investments, the Board reached a 
compromise and recommended that all states be allowed to 
establish FAIR plans. Passage of the Urban Property Protection 
and Reinsursance Act of 1968 authorized FAIR Plans.9 
While recognizing that FAIR Plans are important, some 
insurance representatives have argued that riot reinsurance is no 
longer needed. 
Riot reinsurance insures the companies against excess 
losses that they would sustain during riots or civil 
disorders. The companies pay a nominal reinsurance premium, 
two cents per hundred dollars of reinsurance, to FIA and 
agree to bear riot-related losses themselves up to a stipu-
lated percentage of their total premiums earned from fire and 
related lines. This is generally 2.5 percent of a company's 
earned premiums. According to FIA officials, the 2.5 percent 
figure has covered most of the riot-related losses that com-
panies have incurred to date, and there has been little or no 
need to call on FIA reinsurance backup. From inception of 
the riot reinsurance program to September· 30, 1977, the FIA 
has collected over $100 million of reinsurance premiums from 
private compfBies and paid excess riot-related loss of about 
$12 million. 
In February 1980, James E. Jones, Jr., testified before the 
Subcommittee on Insurance that the favorable experience was indi-
cation that the "potential for riots and exposure to riot losses 
have greatly diminished." Available private insurance made the 
Federal reinsurance program unnecessary. 11 
Data presented indicated that many companies felt that FAIR 
plans could continue to make insurance available to inner city 
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areas even if riot reinsurance were not available. 12 Neighbor.:. 
hood organizations criticize FAIR Plans in general. They 
argue that the number of policies in FAIR programs suggest that 
insurance companies used the program to dump policies they might 
otherwise have written.13 Rates in FAIR programs are usually 
set on the basis of the program's own experience rather than the 
experience of the whole state. This has led to higher rates and, 
in effect, shares the risk only with other high risk properties. 
The unique way in which the program is administered has led one 
author to state: 
The FAIR plan's main problem is that they have legitimized 
redlining. Companies can avoid underwriting in an area for 
whatever reason and FAIR will, in all likelihood, pick up the 
business. In general FAIR plans off~r less coverage at 
higher rates than the voluntary market. 
Another trend has been for increased involvement by insurance 
companies in helping to finance revitalization efforts. 
Because many insurance companies felt that they lacked adequate 
expertise in this area, in late 1981 the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners formed an Urban Reinvestment Task Force 
and an outside Advisory Committee. 
The job of the Task Force and Advisory Commit tee has 
been to discover appropriate means by which insurers can 
expand their roles as investors so as to routinely and 
realistically consider neighborhood investments within the 
full scope of their overall portfolios. 
Many urban neighborhood residents and policy analysts 
have long been perplexed and now increasingly disturbed by 
the fundamental discrepancy between sources for capital 
accumulation by insurers (as well as other financial 
institutions) and the loci for outflows of capital 
investment. While depositors of funds (or purchasers) 
received valuable policies covering life, health, and 
property, the major investments made with the backing of 
such deposits went, 
from those resided 
surprising tnft the 
not louder." 
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in some cases, to locations diffe·rent· 
in by the purchasers. It is frankly 
protests did not occur sooner or were 
The report furthermore highlighted efforts made by companies 
such as Aetna Life and Casualty, Allstate, Connecticut General, 
Equitable Life, Metropolitan Life, Prudential, and Travelers in 
working with neighborhoods and businesses by providing capital 
and other assistance. 
As insurance companies increasingly invest in inner city 
areas, they will also protect those investments by providing 
insurance coverage to those areas. 
Summary 
Ability to secure insurance at affordable rates is a concern 
for many homeowners. Inner city residents had a particularly 
difficult time during the late 1960's and 1970's primarily 
because urban riots created a stiuation where some inner city 
areas were considered by the insurance industry as an unaccep-
table risk. The government responded in 1968 with the passage of 
the Urban Property and Reinsurance Act of 1968. 
This act allowed the states to establish and administer FAIR 
programs. Participating states operate their programs 
differently. Some states use ISO ratings as the basis for 
establishing premiums while others allow for a surcharge. 
Generally, rates under FAIR plans are higher than under conven-
tional insurance--reflecting greater risk. Federal efforts to 
reduce the premiums were rejected with the belief that com-
petition in the insurance industry would be the best indicator of 
risks. 
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One of the questions that this-project will try to answer is 
whether residents in Omaha's inner city areas have access to 
insurance and whether that access is at a higher premium rate. 
In the final analysis, the fundamental issue dividing the 
insurance industry from the neighborhood advocates revolves 
around the question: What is the fair way of spreading risk? 
The literature review suggests that there is a legitimate public 
policy role to be considered when answering that query. 
9 
II. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
Introduction 
Passage of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act in 1975 and its 
1980 amendments provided an opportunity for the public to have 
access to information about lending activity not previously 
available to them. These data and their monitoring value led 
many groups into the arena of evaluating mortgage activity. 
Obviously, the ideal study would have perfect supply/demand 
information. Many researchers and analysts point out that one of 
the difficulties in drawing inferences from the HMDA data is that 
little or no indication of demand is evident. Therefore, the 
lack of lending is a function of demand and not supply. 
The term redlining stems from the practice of drawing a line 
on a map and indicating that the area contained therein is too 
risky to be considered as a candidate for home loans. 16 During 
the initial hearings in 1975 no evidence was given that such 
gross actions existed. Indeed, redlining is now seen as a much 
broader problem than refusal by financial institutions to lend in 
certain areas. Senator Jake Garn (Utah) stated-during the 1980 
hearing: 
I want to again emphasize that redlining is a multifaceted 
problem--it doesn't just happen because lending institutions 
suddenly decide for mysterious reasons or no reason at all, 
that particular areas of a city may be bad investments for 
placing their depositors' money. The problems of urban decay 
are many, and, accordingly, the solutions to those problems 
must be many. 17 
Thus, increasingly redlining is seen as part of a broader 
disinvestment process. Actors in that process can be lending 
institutions, municipalities, and individuals. 
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Types of Institutional Redlining 
Redlining is often a subtle process. Although a long list of 
methods of redlining has been developed, the six most commonly 
used are: 
1. Higher down payment requirements 
2. Intentional underappraisal of homes 
3. Higher than necessary interest rates 
4. Establishment of unrealistic property requirements 
5. Reduction of payback period 
6. Steering of homebuyers away from certain areas. 18 
Measuring the extent of this activity is difficult. During 
the 1980 congressional hearings, the National Training and 
Information Center presented information that showed that over 
270 organizations or groups in 39 states and the District of 
Columbia had gathered HMDA data. Community organizations (119) 
were by far the largest collectors of the data. The next largest 
gatherers were local governments (46), research groups (26), and 
universities ( 11). 19 (See Table 1.) 
Because so many community organizations were gathering and 
utilizing the data, the quality of studies varied greatly. In 
1979, the Department of Housing and Urban Development released a 
publication entitled A Guidebook: Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
and Reinvestment Strategies. The guide sets forth a process that 
community organizations can use to gather, analyze, and monitor 
HMDA and CRA data with an emphasis on the notion of process and 
dialogue as a method of increasing investment in underinvested 
areas. 
TABLE 1 
NUMBER AND TYPE OF ORGANIZATIONS 
COLLECTING HOME MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE ACT DATA 
Number 
Community organizations 119 
Local governments 46 
Research organizations 26 
Universities 11 
Legal service agencies 9 
Newspapers 8 
State governments 7 
Financial instirutions 6 
NHS programs 5 
Lenders groups 5 
Social services organizations 4 
Private researchers 3 
Advocacy groups 2 
Housing resource centers 2 
Resource centers 2 
Counselling organizations 2 
T. A. groups 2 
Others 15 
Total 274 
Percent 
43.4 
16.8 
9.4 
4.0 
3.3 
2.9 
2.6 
2.2 
1.8 
1.8 
1.5 
1.1 
.7 
.7 
.7 
.7 
.7 
5.5 
99.8 
*This table was compiled from information prepared by the National Training arid 
Information Center and presented during the 1980 hearings on the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Amendments of 1980. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1980. 
1 1 
The procedures outlined treat redlining as part of the 
larger problem of urban decay. 
In a study undertaken by the Neighborhoods Uniting Project, 
Inc. in Prince George's County, Maryland, the following redlining 
process was presented, one that neighborhoods frequently undergo 
when they become the subject of redlining by the banks and 
savings and loans and of racial steering by the realtors. 
YEARS 1-5 The neighborhood becomes identified by the realtors 
as an integrated neighborhood. The proportion of 
FHA and VA loans goes from 20% to 50%. If the 
neighborhood can stabilize at this level, it will 
probably remain a stable, racially integrated 
neighborhood. 
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YEARS 5-10 However, the real tors and mortgage bankers have an 
interest in making as many sales as possible. So 
they continue to solicit the neighborhoods for 
houses to sell and solicit buyers from the low and 
middle income areas which are now becoming 
"gentrified." They steer these buyers into the 
area, and it begins to become identified as 
changing. 
YEARS 10-15 The banks and savings and loan companies now become 
hesitant to make loans in the area. Thus, the pro-
portion of FHA and VA loans goes to 80% or 90%. 
Sellers, in order to avoid paying points to the 
mortgage bankers, start to sell to speculators who 
pay cash for the properties. These speculators 
usually buy low and sell high. If they can't sell 
high enough, they rent out the property and milk it 
for all that it's worth, taking the depreciation on 
their taxes. 
YEARS 15 + Foreclosures increase dramatically because mortgage 
bankers who make FHA and VA loans have no incentive 
to stick it out if a buyer gets sick or misses a few 
payments for any reason. They can turn the property 
over to the federal government and collect the 
mortgage insurance. The government takes an average 
of 20 months to get the property back on the market. 
Meanwhile, the house sits vacant and boarded and 
deteriorates. One frequent outcome is for the house 
to end up in the hands of a speculator who puts in 
some cosmetic repairs and sells high to someone else 
who can't afford it.20 
Emoirical Studies 
Most HMDA studies are empirical in nature. In his article on 
mortgage redlining research,· George Bens ton classified the 
research into six types: 
1. Those studies that focus on the number of loans and the 
amount of money going into different areas 
2. Studies that attempt to measure the relative risk to 
lenders 
3. Studies that attempt to measure differences in mortgage 
terms by geographic area 
' 
' ~
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4. Studies that utilize appraisal cost and purchase price to 
determine how the market is functioning in different areas 
5. Studies designed to determine rates and reasons for 
mortgage demands. 
6. Studies that attempt to estimate or measure the demand for 
mortgage money. 21 
Different groups utilize the material for differing purposes. 
For example, David Bartelt's analysis of lending practices in 
Philadelphia showed that 71 percent of the loans were made in 
suburbs outside the metropolitan area. 
However, the data did show that institutions participating in 
the Philadelphia Mortgage Plan had a better record of mortgage 
distribution in low-income, racially mixed, and largely non-white 
neighborhoods. 22 This is useful in policy analysis. 
In Denver, the Community Development Agency collected HMDA 
data and used it to open a dialogue between lenders and 
"informed'' neighborhood residents about their credit needs. 2 3 
Other organizations such as regional planning. agencies, human 
relations departments, etc. have found the HMDA data useful in 
describing trends. 
In a 1977 report, Investment in Residential Properties by 
the Financial Institutions of Cuyahoga County, Ohio in 1977, the 
Northeast Ohio Areawide Coordinating Agency gathered and analyzed 
the HMDA data from 28 savings and loans and ten commercial banks 
whose home offices were in Cuyahoga County. They compared loans 
to deed transfer records and found certain discrepancies in the 
data. 24 
14 
A 1980 study commissioned by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation analyzed HMDA data 
from Buffalo, Chicago, and San Diego. The studies indicated that 
lending patterns sometimes favored residences outside of the 
SMSA's. 25 
Some groups have become involved in monitoring mortgage 
lending activity. (See Table 1.) These studies tend to use 
either HMDA data, testing, or both to ascertain whether redlining 
is occurring. 
The HUD publication, A Guidebook: Home Mortgage Disclosure 
Act and Reinvestment Strategies, reviewed reports on eight 
cities: Chicago, Cleveland, Columbus (Ohio), Hartford, Oklahoma 
City, Salt Lake City, Waterloo (Iowa), and Hilmington. The 
report states: 
These SMSA' s were chosen to 
geographic distribution. The 
metropolitan-wide distributions 
lenders could not be included, 
influential lenders.n26 
give a range of size and 
emphasis was to be on 
and, in cases where all 
on the largest and most 
In the next paragraph the report states, "The data presented, 
however, showed tremendously uneven di stri but ions of lending in 
all the metropolitan areas, exactly the pat tern that would be 
expected if redlining were occurring.n 27 
By doing a detailed review of 44 lending institutions in 
three cities, JRB Associates found that in some institutions a 
significant problem occurred in data accuracy. Indeed, four out 
of eight institutions in Buffalo, five out of ten in San Diego, 
and 20 out of 25 in Chicago were considered to have "unacceptable 
accuracy." 28 All these empirical studies face the difficult task 
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of determining demand and lender risk. Verifying whether risk 
is actual or influenced by lender bias is an area of current 
activity and interest. 
Research Theory 
Efforts to develop a better understanding of disinvestment 
causes and practices have led to construction of certain 
theoretical models. One such model suggests that the housing 
market and mortgage process essentially operates in two 
settings--the institutional and the geographic. Financial insti-
tutions seem to operate as messengers between these two settings. 
Figure 1 shows Kantor and Nys tuen' s model. The authors state 
that the redlining loop--the shaded area--is influenced by the 
larger loop. 
necessary. 29 
Thus, a more holistic view of redlining is 
Figure 1 
.----------------- -;-;~==----~-HOUSIN_G-MAAKET AND MORTGAGE PROCESS 
INSTITUTIONAL SETTING I GEOGRAPHICAL 
i: 
Oenv Mortgage 
,_ Negat1ve ~Message 
-
US Tteasurv Aclmn F'lnny Mae !FNMA). GNMA H-IIMC 
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Efforts to examine these theoretical models have led to other 
types of analysis. In their book, Mortgage Lending and Race: 
Conceptual and Analytical Perspectives of the Urban Financing 
Problem, David Listokin and Stephen Casey offer two models of 
lender behavior. One, the economic model, perceives lenders as 
guided solely by economic considerations. The other, the eco-
race model, sees them as being influenced by both economic and 
racial criteria. Using data from the Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board's Chicago survey and the comptroller of the currency's Fair 
Housing Lending Practice Survey, the authors utilized census data 
and log analysis to determine whether race was a significant 
predictor of lender behavior. They concluded, "The macro and 
micro analyses reveal that race is independently a statistically 
significant influence on lenders." (italics in original)3° 
In an article entitled "Redlining: An Economic Analysis", John 
Segala draws on Glenn Canner's unpublished doctoral dissertation 
to develop a "model of the mortgage market" that shows the impact 
of income on loan ability. The model utilizes various elements 
such as perceived future value (risk) to present economic reasons 
for financial practices that will reduce risk--e.g., higher down-
payments. He concludes: 
Generally, differences in mortgage terms and availability 
across neighborhoods appear to result from differences in 
risk related characteristics of neighborhoods and borrowers 
and from differences in the demand for mortgage loans between 
neighborhoods.31 
He also notes that Richard Haney's 1977 study of race and 
housing value reviewed 17 studies. That review showed that six 
17 
studies found no relationship between race and housing values, 
nine studies found a positive relationship, and two found a nega-
tive relationship.3 2 
Public Policy Studies 
Efforts to analyze and review public policies related to 
disinvestment have become the source of other studies. Several 
investigations have been undertaken that attempt to offer alter-
natives to the present situation. In an article entitled "The 
Redlining Battle Continuing: Discriminatory Effort V. Business 
Necessity Under The Fair Housing Act," John Lucey argues for the 
use of an effect-oriented judicial approach for establishing a 
prima facie case of redlining. If the effect of the action 
created a disproportionate effect, "the plaintiff would not be 
required to identify the particular lending criterion which is 
responsible for the adverse impact to satisfy the prima facie 
requirement.n33 
Even before enactment of the HMDA, the FHLBB had taken 
actions intended to establish the grounds for discriminating. In 
1974, the general counsel's office cautioned readers: 
••• refusing to extend credit and the practice of extending 
·credit on terms which are less favorable than those usually 
offered, to borrowers whose security property is located 
within a predetermined geographic area or areas, because of 
the location of the property, violate section 528.2 (d) if 
such practices have a discriminatory ej'!{ect against members 
of racial, ethnic, or religious groups. 
Wisniewski postulates that more aggressive use of the effect 
rule would encourage financial institutions to be more aggressive 
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in endeavors to meet the credit neects of their service areas.3 5 
Other analysts view the HMDA as incapable of creating the 
type of credit flow to neighborhoods that some proponents wished. 
Reasons for this are: 
First, the HMDA imposes no duty upon banks to refrain from 
redlining or disinvestment. Second, neither the HMDA nor the 
regulations promulgated pursuant to it proscribe an~ sanc-
tions for noncompliance with disclosure requirements.jt 
In response to that deficiency, Congress enacted the 
Community Reinvestment Act of 1977. Lending institutions were 
encouraged to define their service areas and to construct plans 
for meeting the credit needs of the communities in which they did 
business. Rules related to the CRA also contain some type of 
enforcement procedures. Some states like New York, California, 
and Massachusetts have drafted CRA equivalent legislation. The 
net effect of these efforts is to encourage a better flow of 
credit to the areas. Although the laws may not have succeeded in 
stopping redlining, they do represent "a consensus that the prac-
tice of redlining should not be allowed, and that banks should 
reinvest in local communities where they are located.n37 
Many of the pliblic policy issues revolve around different 
perceptions of the appropriate behavior of lenders. In their 
article "Redlining in Housing Markets: Mortgages and Minorities 
in the U.S.," James Barth et al., conclude: 
Three alternative standards of lender behavior are implied in 
statements made by anti-redlining activists, in empirical 
economic research on redlining, and in government anti-
redlining regulations. These are termed, respecti vel.:fi, the 
"social justice," "economic," and "legal" definitions.3 
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The literature on redlining reflects a struggle of values 
concerning the role and responsibility of lending institutions. 
Theoretical models indicate that certain people believe that 
lenders need to be able to determine what constitutes an accept-
able risk. These theorists develop supply/demand/risk models 
that provide logic and reason to avoid certain areas. Other 
theorists attempt to refute pure economic arguments and assert 
that decisions on placement of loans are not value free economic 
decisions, but they rest on assumptions about people and areas. 
How then do and should lenders determine where money should 
be invested? What are their responsibilities to depositors and 
borrowers? What are lenders' responsibilities for social justice 
and societal change? 
Summary 
Community organizations, legal service agencies, and a 
variety of other groups have utilized the HMDA data to monitor 
and document lending activity. 
Some of these efforts have shown that disinvestment exists; 
others have not. The distinction between redlining and dis-
investment is an issue addressed by some of the Hri ters. Dis-
investment does not assume demand; redlining does. Therefore, 
r,vhen data are analyzed, conclusions should not be too hastily 
drawn. By itself, the absence of loans in a particular area does 
not mean redlining has occurred. 
Enactment of the Community Reinvestment Act in 1977 provided 
an impetus for lending institutions 
meeting the credit needs in their 
20 
to set forth a program for 
communities. Some writers 
believe that this act was a positive step to encourage the deve-
lopment of proactive programs. 
Prior to passage of the 1980 HMDA amendments, the Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation commissioned a study of HMDA data in three SMSA' s. 
The reports generated from that study pointed to problems in data 
accuracy, reporting, uniformity, 
suggestions for strengthening the 
and usage 
system. 
and 
Some 
presented 
of these 
recommendations, such as mandating uniform reporting periods and 
the geographic base, have made the data more useful. 
Although some lending institutions actively support the HMDA 
reporting process, many find it somewhat expensive. Moreover, 
some indicate that few requests are made for the ·data and that 
they duplicate information already provided in their mortgage 
application files. 
Perhaps the biggest concern of the lenders is that the infer-
rna ti on will be misunderstood and lead to erroneous conclusions. 
Certainly some of the literature suggests that the road between 
HMDA data and the documentation of redlining is filled with 
perils. Hopefully, this report will avoid some of those. 
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PART II 
DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILES OF OMAHA'S AREAS 
An Overview 
One of the tasks involved in undertaking an insurance 
redlining and disinvestment study of the city of Omaha was 
to determine the appropriate areas for the study. 
Fortunately, the relative currency of the 1980 Census was 
an aid in this endeavor. Generally, the areas east of 42nd 
Street have received most, in fact nearly all, of the 
emphasis when Community Development Block Grant funds and 
other funds targeted for revi tali za tion or redevelopment 
have been allocated. 
The areas east of 42nd Street are widely varied. For 
example, census tract 16.00 has the highest median family 
income of any, but it is abutted by two census tracts with 
median incomes of less than poverty level. Table 1 is 
taken from an article by David DiMartino entitled 
Omaha Area Income Change, 1969-1979 and shows the median 
family income and changes from 1969-1979. 
If the study were to focus solely on inner city 
blighted areas, some important differences 'might be missed. 
Probably insurance risk factors would be too great, and 
demand for mortgage funds might be greatly restricted. 
Therefore, the census data for all 486 block groups were 
run. These data were analyzed to present information about 
the areas. Two tests were established. First, the median 
family income for the areas had to fall within the 1982 
Section 8 definition of low income ($14 ,300 to $24 ,400). 
Second, at least 50 percent of the units had to be owner 
2 
occupied. Table 2 displays some factors about the general 
study area, and a comparison with Table 1 shows some 
interesting differences. For example, the incomes in cen-
sus tracts 61.02 and 30.00 are higher than the block groups 
that were selected. On the other hand, the block group 
selected in census tract 52.00 had considerably higher 
incomes than did the tract as a unit. 
Map 2 depicts the income of the census tracts within 
Omaha. As can be seen, the eastern tracts tend to be lower 
income areas. 
Map 3 shows the percentage of black population by cen-
sus tract. Generally the northeastern tracts have the 
largest numbers of blacks. Also an established black popu-
lation is found in tract 29. 
The Hispanic population tends to be concentrated more 
in southeast Omaha. Map 4 shows the concentration, but 
only in tracts 25 and 26 are more than 15 percent of their 
populations Hispanic. 
Between 1969 and 1979 incomes in ftll areas increased, 
but the rate of increase was les~ in the eastern section of 
the city. Table 3 shows that, in terms of money income, 
many of the eastern tracts had a loss of between 20 and 
30 percent. 
In brief, East Omaha tends to have older housing stock, 
lower income residents, and larger concentrations of 
minorities. Analysis of home mortgage disclosure data will 
show whether or not these factors are correlated with loan 
activity. 
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TABLE 1 .. 
DOUG LAS COUNTY FAMILY INCOME BY CENSUS TRACTS 
Median Family Income Change in Median Family Income 1969 to 1979 
Change in Money Income Change in Real Income 
Census Tract Number 1969 Adjusted I I 1980 1970 1979 a/ 1969 8 / to 1979_Q/ Dollars Percent Dollars Percent 
02.00 20,699 10,094 19,986 10,605 105.06 713 3.6 
02.99 -
-
- - - -
-
03.00 13,723 8,514 16,858 5,209 61.17 -3,135 - 18.6 
04.00 14.561 8,214 16,264 6,347 77.27 - 1,703 - 10.5 
05.00 16,667 5,900 11.682 10,767 182.49 4,985 42.7 
06.00 11,051 7,222 14,300 3,829 53.02 -3,249 -22.7 
07.00 12,009 6,868 13,599 5,141 74.85 - 1,590 - 11.7 
08.00 11,907 7,938 15,717 3,969 50.00 -3,810 -24.2 
09.00 12,981 6.462 12,795 6,519 100.88 186 1.5 
10.00 6,117 4,043 8,005 2,074 51.30 -1,888 -23.6 
11.00 7,083 4,915 9.732 2,168 44.11 -2,649 -27.2 
12.00 5,156 3,560 7,049 1,596 44.83 - 1,893 -26.9 
13.01 9,423 5,675 11,237 3,748 66.04 - 1,814 - 16.1 
13.02 12,292 5.760 11 ,405 6,532 113.40 887 7.8 
14.00 3,986 2,449 4,849 1,537 62.76 -863 - 17.8 
15.00 9,773 3,244 6,423 6,529 201.26 3,350 52.2 
16.00 40,043 5,263 10,421 34,780 660.84 29,622 284.3 
17.00 6,750 5,250 10,395 1,500 28.57 -3,645 -35.1 
18.00 16,250 7,364 14,581 8,886 120.67 1,669 11.4 
19.00 9,452 7,000 13,860 2,452 35.03 -4,408 -31.8 
20.00 14,284 8,188 16,212 6,096 74.45 - 1,928 - 11.9 
21.00 12,068 7,353 14,559 4,715 64.13 -2.491 - 17.1 
22.00 16,642 8,286 16,406 8,356 100.84 236 1.4 
23.00 15,300 8,440 16,711 6,860 81.28 - 1,411 - 8.4 
24.00 14,215 7,848 15,539 6,367 81.13 -1,324 -8.5 
25.00 17,424 8,254 16,343 9,170 111.10 1,081 6.6 
26.00 16,386 8,543 16.915 7,843 91.81 . -529 -3.1 
27.00 16,136 8.451 16.733 7,685 90.94 - 597 -3.6 
28.00 16,194 8,316 16,466 7,878 94.73 . 272 - 1.7 
29.00 12,792 6,191 12,258 6,601 106.62 534 4.4 
30.00 17,856 9,592 18,992 8,264 86.16 -1,136 - 6.0 
31.00 18,327 9,426 18,663 8,901 94.43 -336 - 1.8 
32.00 17,775 8,833 17,489 8,942 101.23 286 1.6 
33.00 13,438 8,261 16,357 5,177 62.67 -2,919 - 17.8 
34.01 19,072 10,034 19,867 9,038 90.07 - 795 -4.0 
34.02 18,377 10,081 19,960 8.296 82.29 - 1,583 - 7.9 
35.00 22,205 12,071 23,901 10,134 83.95 -1,696 - 7.1 
36.00 21,519 10,596 20,980 10,923 103.09 539 2.6 
37.00 23,658 11,496 22.762 12,162 105.79 896 3.9 
38.00 19,565 9,143 18,103 10,422 113.99 1,462 8.1 
39.00 12,605 7,682 15,210 4,919 64.03 -2,605 - 17.1 
40.00 12,108 6,050 11,979 6,058 100.13 129 1.1 
41.00 16,161 6,139 12.155 10,022 163.25 4,006 33.0 
42.00 15,722 9,196 18,208 6,526 70.97 -2,486 -13.7 
43.00 18,979 8,973 17,767 10,006 111.51 1,212 6.8 
44.00 19.583 8,550 16,929 11,033 129.04 2,654 15.7 
45.00 22,037 10.991 21,762 11,046 100.50 275 1.3 
46.00 27,708 14,011 27,742 13,697 97.76 -34 - 0.1 
47.00 38,491 24.412 48,336 14,079 57.67 -9,845 - 20.4 
48.00 19,613 10,194 20,184 9,419 92.40 - 571 
-2.8 
49.00 15,707 8,637 17,101 7,070 81.86 -1,394 -8.2 
50.00 17,500 9,274 18,363 8,226 88.70 -863 
- 4.7 
51.00 10,370 7,686 15,218 2,684 34.92 -4,848 -31.9 
52.00 6,690 4,987 9,874 1.703 34.15 - 3,184 
-32.2 
53.00 11,641 7,096 14,050 4,545 64.05 -2.409 . 17.1 
54.00 14,388 8,556 16,941 5,832 68.16 -2,553 - 15.1 
55.00 22,741 11.794 23,352 10.947 92.82 - 611 
-2.6 
56.00 18,560 9.980 19,760 8,580 85.97 - 1,200 -6.1 
57.00 17,843 9,643 19,093 _8,200 85.04 -1,250 
-6.5 
58.00 18,030 10.782 21,348 7,248 67.22 -3,318 
-15.5 
59.01 17,025 9,225 18,266 7,800 84.55 - 1,241 
-6.8 
59.02- 11,908 8,374 16,581 3,534 42.20 -4,673 
-28.2 
60.00 13,987 8,623 17,074 5,364 62.21 -3,087 -18.1 
Census Tract Number 
1980 1970 
61.01 
61.02 
62.01 
62.02 
63,00 
64,00 
65.01.£/ 
65.02 
66.01 \ 
66.o2 I 
67.01 
67.02 
68,01 
68.02 
69.01 
69.02 
70,00 
71.00 
73.03 } 73.04 
73.05 
73,06 
73.07 
74.03 
74.04 
74.05 
74.06 
74.07 
74.08 
74.09 
74.10 
74.11 
74.14 \ 
74.15 f 
74.16 j' 
74.17 
74.18 
74,19 \ 
74.2o 1} 
74.21 
74.22 
75.00 
Omaha 
66.00 
73,01 ~I t 
73,02 J 
74,02 
74.01 
74.13 
74.12 
Douglas County 
Nebraska 
United States 
TABLE 1- Continued 
DOUGLAS COUNTY FAMILY INCOME BY CENSUS TRACTS 
Median Family Income Change in Median Family Income 1969 to 1979 
1979-"/ 
15,647 
17,593 
17,731 
19,716 
19,768 
21,475 
27,500 
23,571 
24,768 
35,776 
35,761 
34,869 
36,894 
24,363 
31 ,878 
20,159 
20,275 
23,818 
23,592 
37,885 
22,500 
32,534 
26,040 
21 ,714 
24,103 
35,000 
25,322 
25,679 
27;093 
24,607 
23,367 
22,596 
20,458 
21 ,629 
19,144 
19,908 
9,770 
10,837 
8,171 
10,969 
11 ,611 
11,215 
12,385 
11,692 
11 ,737 
19,926 
16,517 
18,048 
18,483 
12,183 
16,638 
10,556 
10,016 
11,190 
16,930 
20,153 
11,417 
14,518 
13,905 
12,218 
10,441 
9,333 
11,624 
13,064 
11,760 
12,182 
11 .479 
10,244 
10,208 
10,419 
8,564 
9,590 
1969 Adjusted 
to 1979..Q/ 
19,345 
21,457 
16,179 
21,719 
22,990 
22,206 
24,522 
23,150 
23,239 
39,473 
32,704 
35,735 
36,596 
24,122 
32,943 
20,901 
19,832 
22,156 
33,521 
39,903 
22,606 
28,746 
27.532 
24,192 
20,673 
18,479 
23,016 
25,867 
23,285 
24,120 
22,728 
20,283 
20,212 
20,630 
16,957 
18,988 
Change in Money I nco me 
Dollars 
5,877 
6,756 
9,560 
8,749 
8,157 
10,260 
15,115 
11,879 
10,917 
15,850 
19,244 
16,821 
18,411 
12,180 
15,240 
9,603 
10,259 
12,628 
6,662 
17,732 
11.083 
18,016 
12,135 
9,496 
13,662 
25,667 
13,698 
12,615 
15,333 
12,425 
11,888 
12,352 
10,250 
11,210 
10,580 
10,318 
Percent 
60.15 
62.34 
117,00 
79.74 
70.25 
91.48 
122.04 
101.60 
93.01 
79.54 
116.51 
93,20 
99.61 
100.00 
91,60 
90,97 
120.43 
112.85 
39.35 
87.99 
97,07 
124,09 
87.27 
77.72 
130,85 
275.01 
117.84 
96,56 
130.38 
102.00 
103,56 
120.58 
100.4 
107.6 
123.5 
107,6 
Change in Real Income 
Dollars 
. 3,698 
. 3,864 
1,552 
. 2,003 
. 3,222 
. 731 
2,978 
421 
. 585 
. 3,697 
3,057 
. 866 
298 
241 
-1,065 
. 742 
443 
1,662 
. 9,929 
. 2,018 
·106 
3,788 
. 1,492 
. 2,478 
3,430 
16,521 
2,306 
. 188 
3,808 
487 
639 
2,313 
246 
999 
2,187 
920 
Percent 
. 19,1 
-18,0 
9.6 
-9.2 
. 14,0 
. 3.3 
12,1 
1,8 
. 2,5 
. 9.4 
9,3 
. 2.4 
0.8 
1.0 
. 3,2 
. 3.6 
2.2 
7.5 
. 29,6 
. 5.1 
. 0.5 
13,2 
. 5.4 
-10,2 
16,6 
89.4 
10.0 
. 0,7 
16.4 
2,0 
2.8 
11,4 
1.2 
4.8 
12.9 
4,8 
£.1 Income figures reported at the time of the decennial census refer to income for the previous year: therefore 1980 Census reports 1979 
income and 1970 Census reports 1969 income. 
'p_/1969 income figures were adjusted to 1979 income figures by using the change in the Consumer Price Index between 1969 and 1979. 
::_!These census tracts were recombined between the 1970 and 1980 Censuses; therefore, comparisons over the decade are less precise than 
for other tracts. 
Table taken from David R. DiMartino's "Omaha Area Income Change, 1969- 1979," Revie\v of Applied Urban Research, November, 1982. 
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Tract 
South 
23.00 
24.00 
25.00 
26.00 
27.00 
27.00 
30.00 
30.00 
30.00 
30.00 
30.00 
31.00 
31.00 
31.00 
31.00 
34.01 
34.01 
34.01 
34.02 
34.02 
34.02 
34.02 
38.00 
North 
3.00 
52.00 
59.01 
59.02 
60.00 
61.01 
61.02 
61.02 
61.02 
62.01 
62.02 
62.02 
62.02 
62.02 
62.02 
Block 
Group 
2 
5 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
2 
3 
4 
5 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
4 
1 
3 
3 
2 
6 
1 
2 
4 
6 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
TABLE 2 
CHARACTERISTICS OF POTENTIAL STUDY BLOCK GROUPS 
Percent 
White 
100.00 
100.00 
97.78 
99.29 
87.51 
97.96 
92.37 
83.29 
98.08 
100.00 
98.75 
100.00 
99.21 
97.69 
95.22 
100.00 
100.00 
97.62 
100.00 
100.00 
95.86 
100.00 
100.00 
57.67 
12.42 
12.50 
15.74 
73.64 
72.47 
59.04 
64.47 
56.77 
98.59 
96.72 
100.00 
89.63 
73.60 
69.26 
Percent 
Black 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.85 
0.00 
4.19 
10.68 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
42.3 3 
85.33 
87.50 
84.26 
25.58 
27.53 
38.98 
28.32 
41.92 
0.00 
1.75 
0.00 
8.89 
26.40 
29.53 
Median 
Household 
Income 
17,386 
17,813 
15,962 
15,774 
14,489 
15,302 
15,393 
15,217 
20,089 
16,172 
16,354 
14,875 
14,505 
18,917 
16,771 
18,906 
16,000 
17,616 
15,325 
15,968 
16,292 
20,625 
19,5 55 
14,342 
15,263 
16,5 53 
15,000 
15,551 
18,199 
1)>,079 
15,324 
14,358 
15,667 
19,200 
17,227 
20,194 
15,179 
16,903 
Total 
Units 
230 
114 
239 
232 
418 
247 
381 
304 
273 
308 
298 
241 
292 
223 
202 
178 
293 
295 
346 
277 
260 
98 
301 
278 
150 
258 
227 
295 
281 
257 
263 
204 
98 
169 
218 
453 
431 
307 
Percent 
Built 
Before 
1940 
80.43 
100.00 
89.54 
96.98 
93.30 
76.52 
71.92 
47.70 
24.18 
52.60 
64.77 
81.33 
78.42 
89.24 
61.88 
70.22 
46.08 
49.15 
80.06 
83.39 
81.92 
70.41 
95.68 
84.17 
89.33 
44.19 
58.15 
66.10 
14.59 
24.12 
41.06 
36.27 
38.78 
42.60 
38.99 
45.47 
62.18 
71.99 
Percent 
Percent of 
Renter 
Occupied 
33.48 
21.93 
20.80 
23.74 
38.26 
32.76 
13.65 
8.45 
6.59 
8.44 
14.29 
36.41 
18.51 
7.62 
4.95 
19.32 
21.24 
9.06 
25.89 
14.44 
17.65 
17.20 
22.65 
28.97 
29.85 
28.35 
24.76 
21.05 
28.41 
13.23 
23.20 
12.30 
37.76 
22.70 
28.90 
6.44 
9.86 
15.72 
Population 
Under 5 
8.76 
7.08 
5.55 
9.17 
7.58 
10.22 
8.96 
6.66 
9.38 
4.34 
5.52 
14.72 
8.58 
6.93 
5.97 
5.76 
12.37 
7.26 
9.03 
13.16 
4.70 
0.00 
7.18 
11.26 
11.29 
15.02 
15.74 
7.11 
11.92 
8.33 
13.17 
15.33 
0.00 
7.64 
5.70 
11.31 
10.94 
11.66 
9 
Percent 
of 
Population 
Over 65 
11.00 
6.27 
21.44 
15.34 
23.16 
11.01 
10.58 
17.21 
8.53 
16.60 
22.21 
11.89 
13.19 
13.56 
19.62 
26.00 
11.03 
15.24 
10.36 
10.73 
24.45 
4.92 
5.44 
7.46 
9.48 
7.46 
10.49 
15.10 
3.60 
12.99 
7.20 
7.83 
11.97 
12.45 
10.40 
13.33 
12.28 
11.42 
10 
•· 
TABLE 3 
POPULATION CHANGE IN DOUGLAS COUNTY, BY CENSUS TRACT, 1970-1980 
Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage 
Population Population Population Population 
Change Change Change Change 
Population 1970-1980 1970-1980 Population 1970-1980 1970-1980 
Total Change Due to Due to Total Change Due to Due to 
Census Population 1970-1980 Natural Residential Census Population 1970-1980 Natural Residential 
Tracts 1980 No. % Change Moves Tracts 1980 No. % Change Moves 
2 4,814 -723 -13.1 2.6 ·15.7 54 3,836 -543 ·12.4 12.0 -24.4 
3 2,727 -527 -16.2 8.4 -24.6 55 5,466 -948 ·14.8 6.1 ·20.9 
4 2,513 -527 -17.3 5.2 -22.5 56 4,413 -962 -17.9 5.5 ·23.4 
5 678 -1,620 -70.5 2.9 -73.4 57 4;679 -948 -16.8 9.5 -23.0 
6 2,232 -1,341 -37.5 5.6 -43.1 58 4,819 -963 -16.7 10.7 -27.3 
7 1,697 -1 ,445 46.0 4.5 -50.4 59.01 2,997 -474 -13.7 13.0 -26.6 
8 2,354 -1,650 -41.2 10.6 -51.8 59.02 3,043 -811 -21.0 10.5 -31.6 
9 1,165 -794 -40.5 9,0 -47.0 60 4,439 -1,533 -25.7 5.0 -30.7 
10 1,555 -622 -28.6 9.1 -37.6 61.01 3,051 -399 ·11.6 16.0 ·27.6 
11 1,238 -1,300 -51.2 -0.4 ·50.8 61.02 4,876 -1,290 -20.9 10.6 -31.6 
12 1,424 -817 -36.5 14.3 -50.7 62.01 524 -386 42.4 3.3 -45.7 
13.01 593 -855 -59.0 5.6 -64.6 62.02 5,133 -997 ·16.3 6.8 -23.0 
13.02 589 -131 -18.2 3.4 -21.5 63 9.746 380 4.1 10.4 -6.3 
14 363 -290 -44.4 8.2 -52.5 64 5,659 -1,293 -18.6 7.2 -25.7 
15 523 ·689 ·56.8 1.9 -58.7 65.01 7,262 219 3.1 5.8 -2.7 
16 2,113 -642 ·23.3 ·6.1 -17.3 65.02 5,554 153 2.8 11.7 ·8.9 
17 876 -690 -44.1 -19.1 -25.0 66.01 7,356 ·655 8.2 f 7.6 f -10.5 18 1,134 -566 -33.3 -20.3 -13.0 66.02 4,729 282 6.3 
19 1,817 -591 -24.5 -7.0 -17.6 67.01 4,008 -594 ·12.9 3.0 ·15.9 
20 2,675 -694 -20.6 3.4 -24.0 67.02 5,083 2,617 106.1 11.3 94.8 
21 2,213 -435 -16.4 2.3 -18.7 68.01 5,978 -755 -11.2 1.7 -12.9 
22 1,815 -727 -28.6 1.8 -30.4 68.02 3,818 -231 -5.7 3.5 -9.1 
23 2,211 -812 -26.9 13.7 -40.5 69.01 6,273 -1 ,510 -19.4 12.9 -32.0 
24 3,154 -528 -14.3 3.1 -17.4 69.02 7,993 -861 -9.7 6.7 -16.4 
25 2,431 -424 -14.9 2.2 -17.1 70 9,504 -571 -5.7 9.7 -15.3 
26 1,992 -367 -15.6 4.7 -20.2 71 7,025 -619 -8.1 10.7 -18.8 
27 2,007 -533 -21.0 3.7 -24.6 73.03 2,023 392 
240} } 28 2,882 -746 -20.6 4.7 -25.2 73.04 1,606 843 110.5 29 4,331 -1,077 -19.9 8.4 -28.3 73.05 3,333 1,357 68.7 19.0 61.7 30 6,212 -1,369 -18.1 4.0 ·22,0 73.06 2,369 2,222 1,511.6 
31 3,397 -804 "19.1 5.4 -24.5 73.07 2,146 314 1 7.1 
32 1,970 -721 -26.8 ·0,2 -26.7 74.03 3,770 -419 -10.0 12.5 ·22.4 
33 2,200 -622 -22.0 7.8 -29.8 74.04 5,315 2,201 70.7 8.9 61.8 
34.01 3,449 -1,173 -25.4 7.5 -32.9 74.05 627 -365 -36.8 8.2 45.0 
34.02 2,642 -600 -18.5 4.5 -22.9 74.06 5,428 3,703 214.7 30.1 184.6 
35 4,728 -773 -14.1 4.1 -18.1 74.07 3,905 636 19.5 17.0 2.5 
36 4,690 -786 -14.4 4.7 -19.0 74.08 5,192 845 19.4 21.0 -1.6 
37 2,832 -641 -18.5 1.2 -19.7 74.09 1,644 116 7.6 19.6 ·12.0 
38 4,480 -977 -17.9 3.4 -21.3 74.10 47 ·88 -65.2 11.9 -77.0 
39 2,306 -450 -16.3 7.0 -23.2 74.11 5,689 1,476 35.0 20.3· 14.8 
40 2,040 -533 -20.7 ·9.7 ·11.0 74.14 12.422 2,180 21.3 ~ 24.5 f 43.0 41 783 -543 -41.0 -10.0 -31.0 74.15 7,469 5,837 357.7 
42 1,550 -344 -18.2 4.8 ·22.9 74.16 6,067 5,347 742.6l } 43 2,755 ·493 -15.2 ·0.9 -14.3 74.17 9,626 9,147 1,909.6 f 88.8 1,007.0 44 1,940 -261 -11.9 5.4 -17.3 74.18 6,226 5,592 882.0 
45 3,415 -497 -12.7 0.2 ·12.9 74.19 6,632 4,449 203.8 f 23.1 f 47.6 46 2,609 -204 -7.3 6.9 -14.1 74.20 6,281 898 16.7 
47 2,483 -318 ·11.4 2.1 -13.5 74.21 8,213 6,907 528.9 f 41.5 ~ 48 4,674 -848 -15.4 4.8 -20.1 74.22 6,681 2,099 45.8 111.5 
49 4,858 -1.001 -17.1 8.9 -26.0 75 13,457 6,101 82.9 11.7 71.3 
50 4,097 ·1,076 -20.8 4.9 -25.7 
51 3,066 -1,013 -24.8 10.1 -34.9 Omaha 311,681 -35,243 -10.2 NA NA 
52 2,826 -584 -17.1 20.3 -37.4 Douglas Co. 397.884 8,429 2.2 89 -6.8 
53 2,314 -883 -27.6 10.8 -38.4 Nebraska 1,570,006 86,215 5.8 NA NA 
Source of base population data is P.L. 94-171 Report for Nebraska, U.S. Bureau of the Census. 
Source of birth and death statistics is Omaha/Douglas County Health Department. 
Table taken from David R. DiMartino's "Omaha Demographic Change 1970-1980," Review of Applied Urban Research, July, 1981. 
Purpose 
PART III 
A COMPARISON OF REAL ESTATE TRANSFERS 
IN THREE OMAHA AREAS 
1 
Analyses of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data provided no 
information about the types of treatment people received from the 
various lending institutions, nor did those data provide any 
facts concerning the number of institutions that borrowers 
contacted, the reasons they selected the institutions, the down 
payments required, and what the loan terms were. To gather some 
of this information, three small samples were drawn from the 
Omaha World-Herald's weekly real estate transfer listings from 
December, 1982 through March, 1983, and homeowners were 
interviewed. 
Methodology 
The structure of these ·interviews was designed to provide 
comparative data by area of the community. One sample consisted 
of transfers in northeast Omaha from Dodge Street to the 
Washington County line and from 42nd Street to the Missouri 
River. Another sample of transactions in southeast Omaha covered 
the area from Dodge Street to the Sarpy County line and from 42nd 
Street to the Missouri River. The control sample consisted of 
transfers in southwest Omaha from 72nd Street to 132nd Street and 
from Dodge Street to the Sarpy County line. 
2 
Information on the date of sale, address, purchaser's name, 
and selling price was gathered through telephone surveys with the 
buyers. Information was also sought concerning the charac-
teristics of the unit, financing methods, down payment, discount 
points, terms of loan, and reasons for selecting the house. 
From each of the three areas 25 completed telephone question-
naires were obtained. 
Findings 
No significant differences were found concerning the type of 
house or the type of construction. Of the 75 houses, 72 were 
single family detached units, and 67 were 1-100d frame construe-
tion. 
Respondents 1-1ere asked, ''Row old is your house?" Not 
surprisingly, the northeast and southeast areas had considerably 
older units. Indeed, 56 percent of the units in the southeast 
were more than 50 years old. One-fourth (25 percent) of the 
units in the northeast were more than 50 years old. No unit in 
the southwest ~<JaS more than 40 years old. Table 1 compares 
housing age by group. 
TABLE 1 
AGE OF HOUSES 
Northeast Southeast Southwest 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
NeH 1 4.2 4 17.4 2 8.0 
(10 1 4.3 8 32.0 
11-20 4 16. 7 1 1 44.0 
21-40 1 1 45.8 4 17.4 4 16 . 0 
41-50 2 8.3 1 4.3 
)50 6 25.0 13 56.5 
3 
Northeast respondents were more likely than those of the 
other areas to have an FHA insured loan. The southeast respon-
dents were more likely to have a loan assumption. The most com-
monly used financing method in the southwest was VA insured 
loans--41.7 percent of all loans. Table 2 compares types of loans 
by area. 
TABLE 2 
METHODS OF FINANCING 
Northeast Southeast Southwest 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Conventional 5 20.0 4 17.4 5 20.8 
FHA insured 7 28.0 4 17.4 4 16.7 
VA 3 12.0 5 21.7 1 0 41.7 
NMFF 1 4.0 
GEM 1 4.2 
Land contract 3 12; 0 1 4.2 
Loan assumption 3 12.0 7 30.4 3 12.5 
Blended 
Seller assisted 1 4.0 
Cash 2 8.0 3 13 
The questions related to whether the borrowers shopped for 
loans and reasons for the selection of the financing institutions 
revealed no significant differences. Most people did not shop 
for loans, and many selected a lender based on the advice of the 
realtor. 
Responses to the question, "For how many years is your loan?" 
showed some significant differences. Shorter loan terms were 
more evident in the northeast part of the community than in the 
other two areas. Table 3 compares the loan terms by area. 
<15 years 
16-20 years 
21-25 years 
26 or more 
TABLE 3 
LENGTH OF LOANS 
Northeast 
15. 8 
15. 8 
5.3 
63.2 
Percent 
Southeast 
5.6 
5.6 
5.6 
83.3 
Southwest 
8.6 
4.3 
4.3 
82.6 
4 
Larger percentages of loans were for shorter periods in the 
northeast than in the other areas, probably a reflection of the 
higher percentage of land contracts in northeast Omaha. 
Southeast Omaha's longer term loans were probably the result of a 
higher percentage of loan assumptions in that area than in the 
others. 
Respondents were asked, "Is your interest rate fixed or 
variable?" About 95 percent of the respondents in both the 
northeast and southeast areas reported that they had fixed 
interest rates. This compares to about So percent of the respon-
dents in the southwest who reported fixed interest rates. 
ltJhen asked what percentage down payment they made, respon-
dents from the southwest indicated a higher percentage down with 
about 23 percent saying they paid 20 percent or more. Table 4 
provides the comparison. 
<5% 
5-10% 
11-20% 
)20% 
TABLE 4 
PERCENTAGE DOWN PAYMENT BY AREA 
Northeast Southeast 
Number Percent Number Percent 
6 33.3 4 28.6 
9 50. 1 8 57.1 
1 5.6 1 7. 1 
2 11 . 1 1 7. 1 
5 
Southwest 
Number Percent 
6 28.6 
5 23.8 
5 23.8 
5 23.8 
This finding suggests that lenders covered their risks either 
by requiring larger down payments or insurance. In the 
southwest, respondents were more likely to either have larger 
down payments or VA insured loans. For the southwest respondents 
a simple correlation of -.39 between down payment and interest 
rate suggests a moderate relationship. That is, as down payments 
increase interest rates seem to decrease. 
the area differences. 
TABLE 5 
OCCUPANCY PATTERNS 
Northeast Southeast 
Table 5 depicts 
Southwest 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Owner occupied 16 
Absentee landlord 9 
64.0 
36.0 
19 
6 
76.0 
24.0 
25 
0 
100.0 
In the northeast and southeast areas, about 30 percent of the 
owners did not live at the address. A substantial number of 
properties in these areas seemed to be purchased as investments. 
Respondents were also asked to identify the lenders who 
financed their purchases. No particular pattern occurred, with 
Introduction 
PART IV 
INSURANCE INDUSTRY VIEWS 
1 
To determine policies concerning the writing of homeowners' 
insurance, teleph.one interviews were conducted with a sample of 
agents, managers, and underwriters. A total of 38 questionnaires 
was completed. Of particular concern were views about regulatory 
changes that would make writing policies in older areas easier. 
Information was also sought on the profitability of different 
lines of insurance, policy underwriting standards, and how indi-
viduals and neighborhood groups could receive better ratings. 
Findings 
The first two questions asked were designed to gather ideas 
about how profitable homeowners' insurance is and to determine 
how it compared to other lines. Most respondents had some dif-
ficulty with these questions for two reasons. First, many 
insurance companies indicated that "generally" the homeowners 
line is profitable but that depends on the weather. 
Second, many of the larger companies indicated that smaller 
regional companies offer much competition. The soft market has 
reduced the profitability of this line of insurance. Companies 
with multiple lines of insurance generally indica ted that 1 i fe 
insurance is more profitable than casualty insurance, and 
homeowners' insurance is usually about as profitable as auto 
insurance. 
2 
Respondents were asked about the relationship between the· age 
of the structure and the type of policy issued with this 
question: "Because of the age of dwelling units in certain parts 
of the community, policies tend to be rated in different classes. 
Would you please explain the rating system?" 
Most of the insurance companies offered three types of 
policies--preferred, standard, and fire cash value policies. 
Preferred policies are usually offered only to modernized, well-
kept properties. These all-risk policies offer maximum protec-
tion at attractively lower rates. On the other hand, fire 
policies do not offer replacement cost and insure against fewer 
perils. These are cash value policies and provide less coverage 
for the money than the other two types. New house discounts were 
common, but definitions of "new" varied from less than five years 
old to less than 15 years old. If all major systems had been 
modernized, an insurance company might offer a preferred policy 
for a rehabilitated home. 
Age was an important factor in rating a policy. Some com-
panies refused to offer insurance to houses over 40 years or so 
old. Others offered only a fire policy to older houses that had 
not been modernized. A few respondents indicated that they 
offered only one type of coverage and that dwellings either 
qualified or didn't. Age was usually one of the determinants of 
whether they qualified. Some respondents indicated that the 
trend of the past few years is to specialize in one part of the 
3 
market--for example, preferred policies--thus reducing overhead 
and allowing for a more focused marketing effort. 
Questions designed to elicit suggestions on actions that 
could be taken to create a more favorable risk condition 
generally produced advice concerning renovation and updating of 
the electrical, plumbing, and heating systems. Agents and 
underwriters seemed particularly a1vare that older neighborhoods 
often housed older people on fixed incomes. Some indioated that 
past records of the owner/resident would be considered. Certain 
older areas were considered good risks because many older people 
do a better job of maintaining their homes than do some younger 
people in newer areas. 
When respondents were asked what neighborhood organizations 
could do to improve insurance rates, the general response was 
that insurance policies are issued on an individual basis, not on 
the basis of neighborhoods. A few indicated that programs such 
as Neighborhood Watch might create a more favorable image. 
Several noted that although neighborhood organizations have no 
direct impact on insurance rates, they can be helpful in creating 
an image that leads to improved housing and neighborhood con-
ditions and that organizations such as the Neighborhood Housing 
Services Program can have significant, positive impacts. One 
official indicated that if a neighborhood asked for assistance, 
his company would provide it. 
Methods for determining conditions of a unit varied. Some 
sent inspectors. Others didn't visit the site but used Equifax 
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data. 1 Most insurance companies stated that they did not use 
area as a factor. Instead they stressed that each policy was 
written on an individual basis. Some, however, indica ted that 
they did not solicit business from certain areas. Most said that 
to maintain value and appearance would help get a better rating. 
The researchers were interested in gathering information 
about how to address the moral hazard problem. Respondents were 
asked, ''In areas where housing values have declined over a 
period of years, the 'moral hazard' problem tends to become a 
factor. What actions could be taken to allow for better 
insurance coverage in those areas?" 
Responses to this question varied greatly. Some stated that 
no moral hazard problems existed2 in Omaha. Most indicated that 
when replacement cost exceeded market value by 20 to 50 percent, 
they would only issue a cash policy, thus reducing the exposed 
risk of the insurance company. Since many companies have a 
$35,000 to $40,000 minimum policy, companies tend to believe they 
are meeting that need although the costs are somewhat higher. 
One respondent indicated that a person's background was important 
in determining moral hazard. 
1 Equifax is one of the insurance industry's larger infor-
mational gathering organizations. 
hazard exists when replacement cost far exceeds 
To insure such a unit for replacement cost would, 
create an incentive to be careless with the 
2 A moral 
market value. 
agents argued, 
property. 
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Policy Rating Factors 
Ten major factors were noted in the answers to the question 
about what influences the rating the property receives. Nearly 
everyone indicated that the property's condition was a signifi-
cant factor. ~ was mentioned as factor next most often, with 
many emphasizing that age of the major systems was more important 
than the age of the units themselves. Several of the respondents 
elaborated on fire protection zones and their role in rating. 
Eight stated that location was not a factor. Six said it was 
because of fire rating-~one of those six stated that rating went 
on the basis of zip codes. Other factors mentioned were pride of 
ownership, codes, past experience of the owner, type o~ construc-
tion, and a home improvement survey. 
When pushed further on the issue of how ratings were 
determined, respondents moit frequently said that trend analysis 
and loss rates are the key determinates. Most of the agents 
stated that the company set the rates. Others indicated that 
they use Insurance Service Office (ISO) ratings. ISO is the 
insurance industry's data gathering service that recommends rates 
based on industry loss data. Some of the large companies use 
their own data for ratings. The individual assessment of the 
property is an important element. 
When the question was asked, "!-low much influence does loca-
tion have on the type of policy offered?," the standard response 
was, "None at all." However, a few respondents did indicate that 
location is important, not only because of the fire protection 
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class, but because of past history. For example, the deductible 
amount might be increased for some areas because of past burglary 
ratings. Even with all the data available, several indicated 
that the final factor in determining risk is a subjective 
judgment. Major systems must be replaced and updated in older 
houses. Beyond that, agents tended to indicate that intangibles 
such as "pride of ownership" are important in policy rating. 
Several suggested that their goal is not to saturate any one 
area. By spreading their coverage over larger geographic areas, 
less likelihood exists of catastrophic loss from a single storm. 
Several pointed out that storms are the biggest factor in their 
loss rate, and storms don't consider a structure's age. 
Apparently that is the biggest uncontrolled factor in determining 
risk. 
Insurance company representatives asserted that they are con-
cerned about telling homeowners that they are receiving fire 
insurance. A few even indica ted that they advise the homeowner 
what needs to be done to reduce the risk and receive a standard 
policy. 
The last question was, "Finally, what changes in state regu-
lations do you feel would be most helpful in increasing insurance 
availablity and reducing costs for all homeowners?" Most felt 
that the present regulations are fine. The sentiment emerged 
that, although current market 
homeowners are benefitting 
conditions 
from that 
are very competitive, 
competition through 
favorable rates and that market conditions will eventually weed 
out unsound companies. 
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The most frequently mentioned suggestion for change focused 
on allowing insurance companies to offer market value 
policies--i.e., a standard policy that would not have to insure 
to replacement costs but rather to market value. Some 
respondents, however, viewed that as undesirable for the policy 
holder and suggested that a fire policy is preferable for the 
owner. 
Another suggestion was that companies be allowed to offer 
repair cost rather than replacement cost policies. 
under a repair cost policy, plaster could be 
For example, 
replaced by 
sheetrock. Such a policy for older homes would have considerable 
appeal because some of the replacement items are difficult and 
expensive to obtain. 
A few representatives from larger companies desired more 
regulation of smaller regional companies. They felt some smaller 
companies are undercutting the market to gather revenue for other 
investments and expressed doubt about this being a good insurance 
practice. One spokesperson even stated that the state needs to 
do a better job of policing insurance companies in order to weed 
out those that redline. 
Some companies said they desire the state to adopt a file and 
use system rather than continue with its prior approval system 
for rate and policy adjustments. Under a file and use system, 
companies would not have to wait for state approval before using 
the new ratings. This would, they argued, provide more flexibi-
lity in responding to changes. 
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Conclusions 
One of the major findings in this activity was that the tur-
moil within the insurance industry in recent years has created a 
very competitive environment. New, smaller companies have 
entered the field to challenge the established firms for 
business. These initiatives are creating changes in the ways 
business is done. New types of insurance programs are being 
created and buyers have many options available to them. 
Most insurance companies offer three types of coverage--
preferred, standard, and fire. Although the coverage and costs 
vary, nearly everyone can obtain some type of coverage. The most 
important factors in determining the type of coverage offered are 
the condition and age of the unit. New house discounts are 
available. Homeowners who have not updated systems in the past 
20 or 25 years will have difficulty receiving preferred or stan-
dard coverage. However, modernized utili ties, major renovation, 
and good maintenance can keep houses in preferred insurance 
classes. The condition of a unit can compensate for age factors. 
Public investments also affect insurance ratings. A city's 
commitment to fire protection is reflected in the class rating. 
Respondents felt that the city of Omaha offered good fire protec-
tion to all parts of the city. 
A few companies said that they did use statistical data on a 
zip code basis to determine ratings. However, larger companies 
might use clusters of as few as 1,000 units as the bases for risk 
calculations. 
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Insurance company representatives said they offered coverage 
based on individual units, not on areas. While a few suggested 
that programs such as Neighborhood Watch might improve image and 
reduce risk, most felt that neighborhood organizations could 
affect rates only indirectly by creating more pride in housing 
which would result in better maintenance. At least one respon-
dent indicated that his company would be willing to work with an 
organization on this matter. 
One specific suggestion for policy consideration was for 
Nebraska to allow for market value policies. To write standard 
insurance policies, companies must insure to 80 percent or more 
of replacement costs. In some instances, companies stated that 
they felt too exposed in that situation ahd write fire policies 
or no policy at all. Some suggested that a market value policy 
i ' 
I would allow for better coverage. 
A few respondents indicated 
that they preferred the current situation and felt that a basic 
fire policy is preferable to a market value policy. Another 
J 
issue that was addressed concerned allowing repair rather than 
replacement cost policies. A market value, repair cost policy 
would provide less risk to companies when insuring older 
dwellings with unique items that would be costly to replace. 
Finally, some spokespersons suggested that the state allow a 
file and use procedure for reviewing rates rather than stick with 
the present prior approval system. 
With these factors considered, however, the overall sentiment 
was that the present state system needs few or no changes. 
